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LITERATURE AS A FINE ART
"The art of reasoning," says one of Wordsworth's eminent
eulogists, "even the art of coherent speech, was to the poet a
kind of art of lying. " "The whole energy of his mind was spent
to reunite what men had put asunder, to fuse in holy passion
the differences that are invented by the near-sighted activities
of the discriminating human intellect." "The unsophisticated
perceptions and thoughts of children and of the peasantry, of
half-witted human creatures and of the animals that are nearer
to earth than we, lent him a more rompanionable guidance [than
his own intellect and] to these spiritual directors he submitted
his heart in humble reverence and gratitude. "
I own I am not sure that the moment has rome when such
assertions seem to damn the poet. A few years since when they
were uttered they took nothing from his eminence. They were
orthodox romantic doctrine. But to-<iay they appear, to me for
one, so discriminatingly true of Wordsworth, and at the same
time so na'ive in their intention to praise, that I have been emboldened to ask whether the shifting mood of the times may not
have brought us again to Jeffrey's Sense of the humours of the
romantic attitude.
Romanticism was at bottom an assertion of the senses against
the intellect-against what Wordsworth himself called
the false secondary power
That multiplies distinctions."

II • • •

And it was but natural that it should have run to excess. The
perception of excess is itself a distinction of the intellect. And
279
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the romanticists repudiated the intellect. They did, perh·aps,
much good. They revived suppressed emotions. They gave the
rein to impulses that may have been enchained by false restraints. But when they proclaimed the supremacy of the senses
in matters which were in their nature essentially intellectualin literature for example-they laid themselves open to the
charge of having abandoned their wits.
Literature is intellectual, and the romantic attempt to assimilate it to the sensuous fine arts-to give it emotion without
intellection, imagery without idea, style without structure-gave
us a lively literature indeed, but a literature that had missed its
point. It was an attempt from which literature is still suffering.
But latterly, with the confusion that such a movement must
inevitably bring, there has occurred a curious inversion. The fine
arts have asserted an intellectual quality. We hear of the thought
of a painting or a sonata. The fine arts are now popularly supposed to be the materials of culture. They are put into systems
of education. Clearly here is a ~Jaoo-~ apply the power that
multiplies distinctions, which Romanticishl, began by eschewing
and has ended-with what intelligence the, eschewal impliesby reasserting in an impossible place. For the fine arts can not
convey thought, and are not agencies of culture. And as for
literature, it is not a fine art.
I

To say that a painting-to take the art of painting as typical
-does not convey a thought to the mind is not to affront art.
It is simply to mark a distinction that corresponds to the truth
that words do not present sensations to the senses. The mental
reactions in the two cases are quite different. Painting gives to
the mind through the senses the thing itself to be apprehended.
Language, by means of arbitrary symbols, gives to the mind not
the thing itself but something about the thing--some relationship, some classification, some generalisation, some cause, some
effect, some attribute-something that goes on wholly in the
mind and is not sensuously present in the thing itself. This
latter process is thought. And I think, I am not going beyond
the bounds of common usage when I add that the only vehicle of
thought is statement. I can conceive no other vehicle than
statement for saying, for example, "When I am grown old and
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death approaches let there be no turmoil of mourning for my
departure. .. The wish, the circumstances, the relationship
between them, have no external equivalents. And though in
Crossing the Bar Tennyson uttered the wish in what we may term
sensuous language, yet there is no sensuous equivalent for what
he wished to express. It is in the nature of such a process that
it is internal; and it is in the nature of the arts that they
are objective and appeal wholly to the senses.
To say this, however, is not to say that no thought is involved
in art. Other things being equal the painter's product may
indeed be enriched in its own peculiar kind by the richness of his
ideas, general and technical. And to say this is not to say that
the observer may do no thinking as he stands looking at the
picture. He does, it is true, receive from the canvas nothing but
the visual impression of things themselves. But with a given
observer this may not end the matter; it does not say what in
his mind . the picture may evoke. A picture may evoke ideas
though,it can not convey them. There is no certainty that the
ideas ~hat arise in his mind are those that were in the mind of the
painter as he conceived and executed the picture. Not until
every line and colour, every light and shadow, shall have come,
like words, to have a definite, conventional meaning, shall he
be able to tell with certainty what were those thoughts and
ideas. Have we on the canvas before us mother and offspring
or nurse and charge? Is it a madonna, or is it Rachel with a
servant's child, mourning for her children that are not? We
can tell only by the title, and th~t is language.
It is true that if the painter, out of a rich nature and a wide
experience, has attained to a keen sense for whatever unformulated laws there may be by which emotion and experience are
written on men's faces, he may hope, indeed, that an observer
rich too in nature and trained in those same laws will think
back from the lines and shadows on brow and cheek and mouth
to the same emotion or experience from which the painter
started. And in truth the painter may come so near to conveying what we may term a thought as would be conveyed by the
words "she loves, " or II she is in trouble, "-matters which are
not visual but purely ideal-though the symbolic means are
uncertain even to so broad an end. If we look, however, into
the range of . even such possibilities we find it very narrow,
largely limited to the human face and figure and the symbolic
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trappings of social life, and leading back seldom more than a
single step to a very general condition behind it. A piece of
literature so limited in thought would be ridiculous. The
observer may, of course, think as much as he pleases, just as he
may think as much as he pleases whatever he may be looking at.
In the presence of a picture his mental process is the same as
before a silent, 'motiouless object: what is conveyed is an image;
his thoughts are his own thoughts.
What has strengthened the belief in the intellectual accomplishment of the picture has been the characteristic romantic
confusion of revery, of the vacant or the pensive mood, with the
process of thought. Sensuous beauty stirs the emotions; the
roused emotions are thronged with imagery and fleeting suggestions; and the mind is agog with a stimulated activity very
easy, especially for the romantic mind, to mistake for a flow of
ideas. Now it is significant that the modern claim for thought
in a picture is coincident with the growth of impressiortism in art.
Art of the classical school was comparatively generalised: the
painter suppleniented and modified his immediate perception of
the object before, him by the aid of his memory of that thing as
seen before, and ~i',thatkind of thing as seen at various times
and under varying conditions; so that the resultant picture was
less strikingly un.ique, was sobered, was in a sense un.iversalised.
The emotional response to it was correspondingly sobered, and
though it stimulated a more thoughtful attention, it never, in
fact, stimulated a claim that it conveyed thought.
It is a commonplace to say that the emotions are comparatively sluggish in the presence of a generic conception, and are
quickened in the presence of the specific. Impressiouistic art,
discarding the memory, purging the mind of all preconceptions,
and endeavouring to capture the fleeting sensation of a moment's
glimpse, attacks the emotions sharply with its unique image.
The emotional response is all that is asked. There is no matter
in the picture for thoughtful study; it must be got at a glance or
wholly lost. And this impressionistic art, which in reality is far
less concerned with thought than the art of the classic school,
none the less stirs the emotional revery that is so easy to mistake
for it. In the event it has remained for the most thoughtless art
to lay the strongest claim to thought-a paradox that is not
without its own tacit criticism, not ouly of the impressiouistic
school-which is beside the present point-but of the whole
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romantic misnomer of the emotional revery as a process of
elevated thinking.

II
Decadence arises out of the primary pursuit of secondary
functions. But though we may assert that the expression of
thought is the primary function of literature, and that its use to
stimulate sensuous imagery is secondary and, as a primary
pursuit, decadent; yet the presence of such poets as Wordsworth
!'oDd his followers and of the taste that approved them makes it
apparent that such a distribution of primary and secondary was
not to the mind of the romantic age. Some analysis, therefore,
of the nature of the elements of which literature is built-the
word and the sentence-may help to fix the distinction.
At the basis of the matter is the fact that language is an
affair of conventional symbols, fairly stable and fairly definite.
The difficulty with line and colour, light and shadow, on the
woman's brow is that men have not agreed that just those marks
should mean, say, "fear for the future." Such an agreement for
every mark in the picture would mean the destruction of the
most valuable quality of painting-its plasticity. But the phrase
"fear for the future" has for all English-speaking people a fairly
uniform meaning just because they have agreed upon the significance of every mark and every sound presented to the senses.
Language can convey thought because writer and reader and
speaker and hearer have got together, in effect, and entered into
a specific compact as to the meaning of every stroke. It is the
fair degree of uniformity in this agreement that gives language
its power to call up in the hearer the idea in 1;,/1e mind of the
speaker.
It is at this point that the romanticists of art and the modern
romanticists of philosophy-the pragmatists-join hands. It
may therefore be worth while to make a brief examination of
their respective positions in order to clarify the distinction between the word and the image, and so between literature and
art. The romanticist values highly the object itself or the illusion
of the object in art, and the direct emotion that the object or the
illusion stimulates. To him that object is in itself the truth, and
its literary value is its emotional value. The intellectual false
secondary power, because it dims the vital reality of the mental
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impression of such .. truth, " seems to him not to reach the mark.
So inadequately does language convey this kind of truth that, as
Wordsworth's eulogist says, "the art of reasoning, even the art
of coherent speech, was a kind of art of lying." Reality is fluid,
continuous; things merge into each other by imperceptible
gradations; whereas words contract and crystallise and make
sharp demarcations. To the romanticist, consequently, the
best part of language is that which comes nearest to evoking the
images of sensuous reality.
The pragmatists, for their part, though they approach the
discrepancy from the opposite direction, arrive at the same
dissatisfaction. They are concerned with reasoning, and they
recognise that explicit reasoning is done in words. They see that
the rational process takes place between concept and conceptthat reasoning is not the concept of the thing itself, but the
nexus between concepts. It is essential to reasoning, however,
that the concepts should be clearly conceived and stable; and if
the reasoning is to be true, it must concern reality as it is. But
how, they ask._callthfs be done in words? Given the word tree,
it corresponds to no particular tree. It names a class, but there
is no such thing as class in nature, in reality. In nature there is
nothing but individuals. Class is a human conception, a human
convenience, a makeshift, associating a number of things no two
of which are exactly alike. Looked at microscopically such a
classification is gross. It may do very well for the coarse processes of everyday life, but for philosophy, where absolute truth
is at stake, no reliable conclusions can be certainly arrived at
by it. And moreover, if every individual member of every class
had a special name, even then reasoning with those names would
not be reliable, for aside from the fatal impossibility of generalisation, nothing remains the same for successive moments. Organic matter wastes and bnilds; inorganic matter disintegrates;
ions speed away into space leaving the original entity less and forever different. Everything is flux, so that absolute truth, if attainable one instant, would not be true the next. Such is the
logic, whether romantic or pragmatic--if indeed these are not two
names for the same thing--of those whose prime concern is for
thing.
If the universe is looked at from the point of view of things, it
may well be true that things are insufficiently stable to act as the
premises of reasoning-that they change even while the rea,soning
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process is going on, so that when the conclusion is reached the
premises are no longer valid. From the point of view of humanity, however, which has invented the rational process for its own
use, such reasoning--for even the pragmatists reason vigorously
--is beside the point. For the human mind there stands in the
midst of changing individual exemplars a class name tree, which
indicates a conception more stable than any single exemplar-an
intellectual convenience because it is more stable. When the
need comes to apply a rational idea to a particular sensuous case,
recognition must indeed be made of the individual variation from
the class type. But the need of such adju.stment is inherent in
the human situation: thought and sense perception are not the
same thing; each takes place, so to speak, in its own compartment forever disjoined from the other save for the connecting
link of the intnition. Reality is in truth a flux, a chaos. Into the
midst of it the human intelligence has been thrust. It possesses,
on the one hand, the mirroring power of the sense perceptions;
but they alone would give it no bearings. It has, on the other
hand, the power of conceiving relationships. If this power is to
be of any service in orientating the chaos it must, it is true, establish a connection with the sense perceptions. But for its own
proper exercise the matter with which it deals must in itself be
stable or there can be no reliability of conclusion. Re3.lity and
the sense perceptions not being stable, the intellect must in its
own compartment erect those correspondent concepts by which
the world of reality is stably orientated. Fundamental to this
process of orientating the chaos is classification, then a symhoi for the class, and so at last a stable datum for the reason.
Whether or not with Plato we explicitly believe in an ideal
prototype, fixed and eternal, of which the fluctuating reality is
but an indifferent imitation, we must, if we reason at all, postulate
such a stable prototype. Such a thing is the basis of reasoning;
without it there could be no reasoning. To rebuke it for its discords with reality is to misapprehend its nature. A consciousness
aware of no ideal stability, aware of nothing but the incalculable
flux, could never have arrive.! at the conception of reason.
And so the pragmatist, viewing the process of reasoning from
the point of view of the flux, casts his doubts upon it, as well he
may. The Rhennish salmon might well doubt his ability to build
a Cologne cathedral of Rhennish water. The romanticist and the
pragmatist, swimming in the flux- of things, may well doubt their
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ability to build anything stable of the stuff of that fluid medium.
Reason is not founded on the basis of the incalculable flux.
Reality and language belong to two distinct categories. WordS,
the symbols of concepts, belong to the stratum of thought and
reason, not to the stratum of reality and sense perceptions. Art,
which simply adds an object to be perceived by the senses,
belongs to the stratum of reality.
Thus pragmatism, though in its own activity somewhat futile,
does us the momentary service of clarifying the distinction between the word and the image, and so the fundamental distinction between literature and art.
If we look to the mere complex elements of language we have
but a more obvious confirmation of the belief that the peculiar
function of literature is to convey thought. Language has uuiversally evolved the statement-so uniformly, indeed, that we
may think of the statement as we do of the word-as innate.
And the statement is peculiarly limited to the process of bringing
concepts into relationship and uttering truths about them-a
process that in its nature is one of thought. The words in a
statement, being mere symbols and not the things themselves
or the illusions of them, can in themselves, unlike the painting,
put nothing new into the mind of the reader. Their only power,
as individual words, is to call up to the centre of his attention
ideas that are already stored in his mind. But they have, in
grammatical succession, this power: they can put the ideas that
are already stored in his mind into new combination. The
whole process, the whole point of the statement is to bring the
images, the ideas, the concepts that are embodied in words and
already held in solution in the reader's mind, into new and significant relationships. And this is a process of thought. This
is the creative power of the statement; it is the only creative
power of the statement; it is, as a consequence, the only creative
power of literature. It is siguificant, therefore, for our conclusion, that the only creative power of literature is a matter of
thought.
Naturally enough, however, an individual mind may fall far
short of the collective mind through which. a language has
evolved, and turuing back upon the intellectual path may cast
aside the classification or other relationship symbolised in the
single word, and substitute a single image. Tree may evoke a
particular tree;justice may be simplified to a single circumstance.
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The simpler the mind and the more meagre the experience, the
mme individual, when that experience is called upon, will be the
conception that comes in response to the symbol. If I have seen
but few trees; and but few instances to which I have attached the
term justice. and if I have been far more concerned with things
than with thoughts, my mental response to those terms will
be correspondingly sharp, and individual, and concrete.
From some such fact arises our saying that children and
savages have more vivid imaginations than civilised men. No
doubt from some such conception did Wordsworth "submit his
heart in humble reverence and gratitude" to the "spiritual
direction" "of children and of the peasantry, of half-witted
human creatures, and of the animals that are nearer to earth than
we. " No doubt from some such fact did he prefer, in his theory
of poetic diction, words which in such mouths were most free
from intellectual content. And though he was by no means able
to live up to his theory in his choice of words, yet the very
quality of his poetic purpose was displayed in it. He strove to
go counter to the inherent function of his medium and make his
words serve the simple end of evoking the simple image-the end
pursued by the painter. He did pretty well. For even the cultivated mind, by virtue of its power to fill in a generic conception
with the individual elements which it involves, can simplify the
general into the particular; and so it is possible, even for such
a mind, to use words in a way almost to eliminate thought, and
do little more than create an image.
In the sentence too it is possible so to combine words as to
reduce to a minimum the mind's attention to the relationship
inherent in the sentence form. There are colourless verbs, verbs
that declare sensuous acts, connectives that merely locate objects
in visual space, so th~ too it is possible to produce upon the
reader's mind an imp~approximating that of the painting.
". . . I saw a crowd,

••

A host of golden daffodils;
Beside the lake, beneath the trees,
Fluttering and dancing in the breeze."

It is not that such mere imagery is impossible in words and
sentences; it is not even that such imagery is illegitimate in
literature. Such imagery is among the valuable possibilities at
its command. The evil is that they should be elevated to the
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first place as Wordsworth elevated them. How inadequate such
an inversion is, is recognised by Wordsworth's own eulogist.
"How," he asks, II except in some transcendental sense, can a
moral expression be given to a sunset? No clearly rounded
period can reproduce that marvel with all its vague messages to
the heart. And it was this sort of power, and this sort of beauty,
that was the inspiration of Wordsworth's poetry." His aim, in
other words, was to use language, not for intellectual and moral
ends, but for sensuous and resthetic ends. It is for such primary
use of a secondary function that Wordsworth subjects himself
to the criticism of being a decadent; and it is against a taste that
tolerates the confusion which such decadence entails that it
seems timely to repeat, and ever, to repeat the protest of Lessingthe protest of those in whose vision of life literature fills a nobler
place than that of pander to the senses.
How wrong the romanticists' conception of the function of
literature is, has a demonstration perhaps more convincing than
that of the nature of words and sentences. The word and the
sentence are not the consciously wrought elements of literature.
They are lingnistic, and descend to us out of the darkness.
What may be held as more significant, therefore, is the conscious
use to which they have been successfully and pers;stently put.
The genres which have grown up under conscious selection should
show what, historically, has been the deliberate judgment of men
in the matter.
That language is the one medium suited to the conveyance of
thought is sufficiently declared by the fact that it has always
been the prime agent of those processes that are wholly matters
of thought-criticism, science, philosophy, even pragmatic philosophy. The doubt and confusion, however, with which we are now
concerned arises about those other genres to which other than
intellectual and moral ends have been attributed-those which
are more narrowly called pure literature-the epic, the prose
narrative, the drama, and the lyric. These are the consciously
wrought genres which have given rise to the fusion of literature
and the fine arts.
The distinction, however, now that we are on the ground,
seems even here simple enough. Though there are other ends to
which painting may be used, such as matter-of-fact illustration,
the fine art of painting in common with the other fine arts has
had unifonnly an resthetic end. It is the fundamental character-
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istic of the resthetic that it appeals to the mind through the
sense, that the senses are the medium of our perception of beauty
-that beauty, except in a merely figurative sense, inheres only
in sensible objects. The intellectual, on the other hand, has no
direct relation to beauty. It resides, not in the sensuous things
in which beauty may inhere, but in the mental nexus between
them. We should expect, therefore, that just as the processes
that make use of the sensuous media-;>ainting, sculpture, music,
and architecture--have an resthetic end; those which make use
of an intellectual medium shonld have an intellectual and moral
end. This, we shonld say, moreover, would be still more undoubtedly the case if, as far as conld be judged from history, these
latter processes-the literary-had grown up through a demand
for their intellectual and moral accomplishment. And in fact
such is the actual case. What is the most striking verdict of the
past, indeed, is the utter absence of any recognised literary genre
wholly given over to those resthetic purposes which characterise
the fine arts. Even though it is entirely possible for langnage to
approximate such a purpose, no such genre has survived.
It is not that such a possibility has been until our modern
times unknown. It is not that we have discovered a new use for
an old instrument. Such a use is as old as literature--sufficiently
old, at least, to have provoked Plato's protest when he saw it
undnly emphasised, and to have characterised Plato's practice
in moderation and subordinately to an intellectual purpose. It
is highly significant, therefore, that though men have been fnlly
aware of the sensuous possibilities of language, yet no genre
corresponding to the epic, the prose narrative, the drama, and
the lyric has persisted of which the prime function is purely
sensuous. The sensuous element in all the persistent types
has been wholly subordinate and secondary.
It is not difficult, on the other hand, to believe that these
persistent types do in fact owe their survival to their intellectual
element. What is dlfficn1t is to imagine a narrative--using the
term loosely to cover the epic, the novel, and the short story-in
which the successive events have nothing to do with each otherin which, in other words, the intellectual and moral relationship
of cause and effect is not the informing-element. We may indeed
have a volume of short stories or ballads in which such a chain is
constantly broken. That, however, is not a matter of literature
but of the bindery. When the line of cause and effect ends, the
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piece of literature as such ends. If our concern were purely
resthetic it would make no difference whether the successive
events were interre1ated-whether we knew of the early seduction of Tess, whether we knew that Sohrab and Rustum were son
and father, we should be concerned with each successive image
for itself, just as we demand no antecedent picture to the Mona
Lisa; no subsequent picture to a landscape of Corot.
So completely is our concern in a novel or an epic bound up
with the relationship of cause and effect-a purely intellectual
conception-that we can not conceive such types of literature
without it; and indeed without it such types could not exist.
Even should we reduce the narrative to such sensuous simplicity
as Daudet has done in his "pastels"-to minute particles--and
reduce each particle as nearly as may be to a series of objective
sensuous images, yet those pastels gain each its significance from
the idea to which the sensuous images belong. .. The little
Dauphin is ill; the little Dauphin is dying," begins one; and the
significance of a whole series of images is thus gained-else why
mention the fact? Before we are through we have sensuous
images enough to warrant the conclusion, expressed in the Dauphin's own words, that in the presence of death· earthly rank is
of little comfort. The very quality of narrative is this relationship-a fact that separates it sharply and forever from the
purely sensuous purpose of the piece of fine art; For what is the
significance of this demand for cause and effect, this concern for
consequences and conclusions, but an intellectual curiosity, and
ultimately a moral compunction in the presence of life? It is
true that with a given reader the intellectual and moral essence
may be obscured, just as with a given observer the resthetic value
of a work of art may be obscured. And in a given narrative the
intellectual and moral value may be low just as may the resthetic
value of a piece of fine art. None the less the aim of each is
determined, not by the obtuse reader or observer, or by the
unsuccessful example, but by the touchstones which long experience has applied, and by which have been determined the
surviving types. In literature that touchstone has been men's
intellectual interest and moral concern in the spectacle of human
life.
That Aristotle agrees with this idea may be nothing; but that
Aristotle's judgment has been confirmed by the judgment of
ages; and that those trial types that have not conformed to this
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judgment have been willingly let die by men who have never
heard of Aristotle or his judgment, is not without significance.
We skip, not the action, but the description, not the current of
cause and effect, but the part that stops to give a sensuous
image. Our concern is intellectual and moral.
In the drama this is even more obviously true. Here the
whole demand is for so close-wrought a chain of causal relationships that no room is left for deviation, no chance for sensuous
description; and though the whole is sensuously enacted before
the spectator, J@; the significance is wholly in the causal relation
revealed in the words. Every unmotivated action is a blemish.
The lyric at first sight seems to offer more difficulty. It is
in lyric poetry that the romanticists have found their pleasantest
grounds. It was the decadent lyric poets that the moralist Plato
railed against more than two thousand years ago. It was the decadent lyric poets that the moralist Tolstoi railed against the other
day. Ali literature is susceptible to the over-cultivation of its subordinate qualities, and the lyric is peculiarly susceptible. For its
avowed attempt is to present an idea in all its moving power.
Emotion may be stimulated by the concrete matter of the poem
whether the idea is present or not; and there is the chance of the
romanticist. Nothing can prevent one who has no intellectual
tastes, and for whom life is a matter of beer and skittles and the
titillation of his sensibilities, from ignoring the one and indulging
the other.
.
And yet in the nature of the lyric seems to be sufficient
indication that here as in other poetry the idea is primary and the
emotion seoondary. The persistent types are characterised by
their ideas. The ode sets out with its idea; the sonnet with its
idea; the ~legy with its idea. The love lyric, classified by its
emotion, iills back, in the event, for its materials upon thoughts
about this pregnant feeling.
II

Then come kiss me, sweet and twenty;
Youth's a stuff will not endure."

The lyric, like the other genres that use the intellectual medium,
seems to bl' rational in its intention.
The confusion in the case of the lyric, and to a degree in the
whole case of literature, arises out of the romantic identification
of all the emotions as resthetic. Now if anything may be said of
the resthetic it is that it is one of the co-ordinate exercises of the
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mind, parallel with the intellectual, the moral, the religious, and
others. And of the emotions it may be said that they are not
co-ordinate with the intellectual, the moral, and so on, but are
concomitant with them all; that thel[ are the running obbligato
to all the other preoccupations of 'consciousness. There are
intellectual emotions, so to say, that arise at the perception of
logical relationships and ideas, such as every thinking being
experiences at the triumphant moment of understanding or
discovery:
II

Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken. "

The love of truth is an intellectual emotion. There are moral
emotions such as love, hate, terror, pity, sympathy, and the host
of feelings that arise over this most extensive preoccupation of
humanity. There are emotions that accompany sensation. Of
these last, those that arise at the sight or sound or imagination of .
sensuous beauty are properly described as !eSthetic. To endeavour to spread the term msthetic to all emotions is to render
it meaningless; yet how ready the decadent is to do so is shown
in his eagerness to bring even Aristotle to his aid and claim him
as an !eStheticist because he has said that the service of tragedy
is to rouse and purge the emotions of terror and pity in the minds
of the spectator.
Why the decadent is so anxious to identify all the emotions as
!eSthetic is perhaps not difficult to understand. The !eSthetic is
felt to be an end in itself; it is an enjoyment pure and simple; it
looks no farther than the moment of its experience; it has no
ulterior responsibilities. It is the easiest of all ends, for its basis
is in what all men inherently possess-the sensations-and its
attainment is sponta.I)eous and pleasant. The other ends claimed
for literature are on the contrary more difficult. The intellect
grows only under rigid discipline; its exercise is bound by exacting standards. The moral sense is weighted with the direst
responsibilities. The intellectual and the moral together are
fraught with the heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible world. The resthetic is the escape from all this. Not but
that such an escape in its proper sphere, in its own city of refuge,
is a boon. The sense of beauty is one of the choicest possessions
of mankind. But if all cities, even the capital city, are to be
turned into cities of refuge, where are order and justice to be
administered?
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To think of literature as primarily resthetic in its purpose
would appear to be one of the shifts of mental lassitude, an
evasion of the pains of thought, of the burden of moral obligation. It is possible to be too rigid in our conclusions--to look too
wholly without bowels of sympathy upon that beauty in literature which gives it much of its charm, and by endearing it to our
intenser affections makes its sterner aspects more lovely and
acceptable. Literature without the grace of beauty-Ibsenism,
Zolaism-is, like the life it depicts, a repulsive thing. Yet if we
think of the nature of words, of the nature of language, of the
nature of those demands under which the persistent types of
literature have developed, it is hard to escape the conclusion that
literature is primarily, not resthetic, but intellectual and moral.
Our protest is not against a thing, but against an excess; not
against a proportion, but against a disproportion.
The robust intelligence, unafraid of the rigours of its own
exercise, finds some censure to bestow upon a lassitude that
would, for its own sensuous gratification, ~pread abroad the
rumour that literature belongs to the realm of sensations and
sensuous emotions--some censure to bestow upon a literary taste
that would elevate to a high place in its regard a poetry that
ministers to mental lassitude, and, like the Daffodils, has
little point save the gratification of the sensuous emotions. For
my own part, realising that in the last analysis human nature is the
most important element in life, I humbly dare to propose human
nature with all its complexity, its subtle fluidity, its mysterious
consciousness, as the subject of literature. And recognising that
literature must reflect this complexity, I believe that this reflection can be thrown by no mere sensuous surface, after the
manner of the fine arts. It must be more than simply visual, and
more than simply auditory.
To accomplish its purpose the spirit of literature has
sought out the one medium suited to intellectual ends, has
used that medium exclusively, and has developed ouly genres
whose organic structure is wholly intellectual. In view of these
considerations I can conclude only that literature is not a fine
art ministering to the emotions, but a reflection of human
nature, intellectual in its mode, critical in its spirit, and moral in
its function.
S. B. GASS.
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